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Review Essay
What Does "Religion" Mean in the Public
Square?
Democracy & Tradition. By Jeffrey Stout, Princeton University
Press, 2004.
Reviewed by Marci A. Hamiltont
Jeffrey Stout has addressed an important and pressing
contemporary question: how can religious believers participate
in the public square?1 Or, in the obverse, can religious belief be
a legitimate ground for constructing public policy? In his words,
he hopes to "reopen the entire question of the role of religious
reasoning in public life." 2 He is responding to the thesis that
has been put forth by many now that the only legitimate speech
between citizens in a democracy is that which springs from
common ground-I will call this theory the common-ground
theory. And if common ground is required for public reasoning,
differences in belief must be shuttled to the sidelines. The the-
ory was in part an instinctive response to the increasing het-
erogeneity of the United States, including differences based on
religion, national origin, and local culture. If there were all
these differences and no shared viewpoint, how could public
discourse address any topic with any coherence? Not a bad
question at all. The communitarians tried to answer it in the
concrete while the common-ground theorists did so in the ab-
stract. Either way, they share the assumption that there must
be a homogeneous base of values to solve the problem posed by
t Visiting Scholar, Princeton Theological Seminary; Paul R. Verkuil
Chair in Public Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
I would like to thank Larry Stratton for his thoughtful comments and Rachel
Steamer for her excellent research assistance. Copyright © 2005 by Marci A.
Hamilton.
1. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY & TRADITION (2004). Stout is the acting
chair of the Department of Religion at Princeton University.
2. Id. at 77.
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pluralism. In the end, the communitarians and common-ground
theorists simply moved the discourse back to where it started-
a need for sameness where it does not exist. Stout proposes an
answer that does not insist on homogeneity as a precursor to
solving social problems.
The common-ground thesis shuts out religious believers,
making them second-class citizens because of their beliefs. That
has led religious believers, who have permitted themselves to
believe that the theory describes reality, to feel disenfranchised
and second-class. That has typically played into an argument
that somehow the culture is discriminating against them. As a
political reality, they are not being discriminated against, but
rather being forced to accept into the political fold a wide vari-
ety of religions beyond their own. Setting aside for now the po-
litical reality, the result of the secularization thesis has been
that the Christian right, among others, has embarked on an of-
fensive against American "secular" culture. They have criti-
cized school districts that will not permit Christianity to be the
only faith celebrating the holidays, 3 and they have worked as-
siduously to introduce the Ten Commandments as the single
legitimate source of American law.4 Their actions are impas-
sioned and in fact quite dangerous to the United States, be-
cause they portend theocracy in the midst of enormous reli-
gious diversity. Hence, what Stout intends to address is
something of a social emergency.
He says that the plurality of religious views need not be
excluded. 5 He calls his answer "conversation."6 By this he
means "an exchange of views in which the respective parties
express their premises in as much detail as they see fit and in
whatever idiom they wish, try to make sense of each other's
perspectives, and expose their own commitments to the possi-
bility of criticism." 7 In other words, any justification or expla-
3. See, e.g., Skoros v. City of New York, No. CV-02-6439, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2234, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004); Sechler v. State Coll. Area Sch.
Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2000); see also Sara B. Miller, In
Schools and Cities, Battles over Holidays Without the C-Word, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 15, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/
1215/p01s03-ussc.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
4. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003); Connie Baggett, Commandments Adorn Judge's
Robe, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at F3.
5. STOUT, supra note 1, at 10.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 10-11.
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nation can enter the public square legitimately. It is not neces-
sary that all citizens share common ground to reach public pol-
icy, and indeed it is not possible that such a diverse culture
could operate that way. That does not mean all ideas are cre-
ated equally-quite to the contrary, some will be more effective
in addressing social problems than others.
Democracy & Tradition is intended to answer the social
critics who have repeatedly responded to the common-ground
theory by saying that it leads to secularization, that the entire
culture has been secularized, and therefore religion has been
marginalized and trivialized. This theme has dominated the
public discourse about major Supreme Court cases interpreting
the Establishment Clause, including those dealing with vouch-
ers for religious schools,8 the Pledge of Allegiance, 9 and the Ten
Commandments. 10 The foremost legal scholar to have furthered
this view among the public is Yale's Stephen L. Carter, whose
The Culture of Disbelief- How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion1 was widely read in the academy
and in the political sphere. It would be difficult to overestimate
its impact on the thinking of politicians. For example, in the
portrait of President William Jefferson Clinton that hangs at
Yale Law School he is holding the book. 12 As Stout makes clear,
it is a viewpoint that has been fostered by the likes of John
Rawls's political philosophy, 13 among others, but it cannot cap-
ture the reality of what happens in fact in the marketplace of
politics and expression.
Stout's astute approach is to agree with the religious critics
that there is secularism in the public square, but then to assert
that religious expression coexists: 'Modern democratic reason-
8. E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
9. E.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violate the Establish-
ment Clause), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004) (holding Newdow lacked standing).
10. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 346 (Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-1500); ACLU v. McCreary County, 354
F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 (Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-
1693).
11. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
12. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at Yale University
Alumni Luncheon (Oct. 9, 1993), http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/
100993-speech-by-president-at-yale-alumni-luncheon.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2005).
13. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 294-95.
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ing is secularized, but not in a sense that rules out the expres-
sion of religious premises or the entitlement of individuals to
accept religious assumptions."14 It is a benign and open secular-
ism, which consists in "discursive presuppositions, not neces-
sarily the worldview or state of consciousness of participants in
the" conversation,15 rather than a closed forum. Thus, he re-
fuses to accept the widely accepted belief that the realm of ex-
pression in the United States must be either secular or reli-
gious. This refusal to think dichotomously leads to a fresh and
more nuanced characterization of what is happening in the
public square in fact. Indeed, he corrals many of the dichoto-
mies of our day and brings them under one theory: Democracy
vs. Tradition; Narcissism vs. Society; Theocracy vs. Secularism;
Monotheism vs. Pluralism; Believers vs. Atheists. By rejecting
the bipolar questions, he crafts a philosophy that lets every
American citizen into the conversation as a legitimate partici-
pant: 'Vague references to God from the crepe-lined podium
cannot finally disguise the vast array of theistic and nontheistic
religions Americans embrace. Need I add that dissenters, free
thinkers, atheists, and agnostics are citizens, too?"16 From a
factual perspective, this is a refreshing book. The hyper-
abstraction of Rawls's approach left out not only the fact of re-
ligion, but also the fuller apprehension of the varieties of relig-
ion and belief that Stout brings to the project. Rawls con-
structed principles of justice based upon an "original position"
in which rational actors were required to make decisions be-
hind a "veil of ignorance," where "[t]hey do not know how the
various alternatives will affect their own particular case and
they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of
general considerations 
.... If a knowledge of particulars is al-
lowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies."17
In other words, public decision making depended on a suspen-
sion of one's personal beliefs, which makes religious convictions
peripheral to public exchange.
Stout's incisive answer to Rawls is worth repeating: "Rawls
seems to be saying that while the right to express our religious
commitments freely is guaranteed twice over in the Bill of
Rights, this is not a right of which we ought to make essential
use in the center of the political arena, where the most impor-
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id. at 175.
16. Id. at 1.
17. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999).
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tant questions are decided."'18 In addition to his observation
that Rawls's theory makes First Amendment rights irrelevant,
he also points out that Rawls is placing artificial restraints on
the scope of the answers available for the hard social issues. He
quite rightly asks, "Why limit oneself in the Rawlsian way to
the quest for a common basis, given the possibility that a com-
mon basis will not cover all essential matters?"1 9 What Stout
has done is to put into words an intuition that many of us have
had since the first time we were introduced to Rawls's work: it
is an ideal, an abstraction that may well be worth the mental
exercise, but that does not echo our own shared experience in
the public square. The ideal sounds good, as it
could resolve any given political controversy on the basis of reasons
that none of us could reasonably reject. But it has not been demon-
strated that all important controversies can be resolved on this sort of
basis, so it seems unwise to treat the idea of public reason as if it en-
tailed an all-purpose principle of restraint.
20
He could not have better characterized what is amiss in Rawls's
account of public deliberation, which is the theoretical base on
which the myth of marginalization and secularization has been
constructed.
The theory here, though, is not that all religious reasons
will float in the political sphere. Some will sink quickly, and
even impede further debate. Stout does not advocate complete
validation for any religious view spoken at any political mo-
ment, or that religious individuals should raise religious rea-
sons for their public policy positions at every turn, but rather
acknowledges that "there are moral as well as strategic reasons
for self-restraint. Fairness and respectful treatment of others
are central moral concerns."2 1
He concedes, as he must, that religious discourse may at
times be a "conversation-stopper," but not always.22 He knows
that it can be both beneficial and an impediment because he
has observed the conversational practices in this culture.23 This
is an ethicist who has resolutely refused to lock himself into the
ivory tower to construct the theory that "explains it all," and
instead, by walking among his fellow citizens, has identified a
18. STOUT, supra note 1, at 68.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id. at 75.
21. Id. at 65.
22. Id. at 85-86.
23. Id. at 10-11, 85-91.
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complex discourse, incapable of being captured by an either/or
formula. It is not either secular or religious, but rather both
and more. There can be no question that he is right about this
factual claim. No matter how finely spun the theories that re-
quire reason and reason alone to ground public policy are, there
has never been a time in the United States when religion has
not been a driving force behind social policy, let alone alto-
gether excluded. In some ways, then, Stout's theory is unmask-
ing what is a settled American practice. It is a fascinating move
whereby the philosopher-theologian is reintroducing the con-
crete into the abstract.
Stout has given voice and shape to inchoate ideas in U.S.
culture that needed expression, because the widely held as-
sumption that the United States stands on a precipice and
must choose religion or secularism has led to a standoff that is
not justified. Religious entities that have bought into the "secu-
larization" thesis have been sold a bill of goods, and it is urgent
that they come to understand that their views are not being
and should not be excluded. He has initiated an open-ended
conversation with all of us and with the leading theologians
and ethicists of our day, and he has brought to the discussion
the American philosophers and pragmatists, Ralph Waldo Em-
erson and John Dewey. This is a brilliant book, well worth
reading and contemplating.
This Review Essay will focus on two terms that are at the
base of Stout's thesis, "religion" and "democracy," and ask what
they mean in the text and what they might mean. I raise nei-
ther question to condemn the work, but rather to suggest a
need for further elaboration.
I. WHAT DOES "RELIGION" MEAN?
The central thesis of Democracy & Tradition is that reli-
gious discourse can indeed participate productively and con-
structively in the public square.24 Stout has thereby broken
through the liberal taboo that demotes religious speech to inef-
fective and even inexpressible speech. That is an enormous
move that deserves everyone's attention. He has not, however,
broken through the conservative taboo that forbids saying that
religious entities can (and often do) work against the public in-
terest.
24. Id. at 1-13.
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What is this "religious" discourse that he would validate in
the public conversation? I will delineate what Stout seems to
mean and then offer a critique that is not intended to scuttle
the theory, but rather is a plea for further elaboration.
He starts Part II, where he focuses on this question most
closely, by defining the freedom of religion.25 It has two compo-
nents. It is first, in Stout's view, the right to choose answers to
"religious questions," such as "whether God exists, how God
should be conceived, and what responsibilities, if any, human
beings have in response to God's actions with regard to them."
26
This characterization taps directly into the Constitution's abso-
lute right to believe as one chooses.
Second, there is, in Stout's words, the "right to act in ways
that seem appropriate, given one's answers to religious ques-
tions-provided that one does not cause harm to other people or
interfere with their rights."27 Once again, he is echoing the Su-
preme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, which I have re-
cently explained rests on the principle of "no harm."28 This
might have been the moment where he inched toward the con-
servative taboo, but he pulls back almost immediately.
His next statement is that "the expressive acts obviously
protected by this right are rituals and other devotional prac-
tices performed in solitude, in the context of one's family, or in
association with others similarly disposed."29 When one adds
this description to his examples of the beliefs one might hold,
which in the main tend to be monotheistic, the picture of the
religion that will operate within his theoretical universe is be-
coming clearer, and not quite as factual as one might have
hoped. Religion, on this account, seems to be closer to Sunday
school religion than the teeming marketplace of religion in the
United States.
There are many aspects of religious observance in this plu-
ralistic religious culture that are not benign. For example, the
faith-healing family that lets a child die from a medically
25. Id. at 63.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and
the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099 [hereinafter Hamilton, Religious In-
stitutions]; see also MARcI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND
THE RULE OF LAW (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL].
29. STOUT, supra note 1, at 63 (emphasis added).
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treatable ailment has followed its "devotional practices," but
has engaged in socially unacceptable conduct. The parents who
would sacrifice their children for their religion are intending to
engage in what they may have believed were "devotional prac-
tices," but they are not obviously protected under any reading
of the First Amendment-especially where they are not men-
tally stable.30 The law must protect those children even when
religion is invoked. This same principle of social incompatibility
can also be illustrated by the Ku Klux Klan's burning of crosses
in African Americans' yards,31 the church that beats teenagers
during services, 32 or the church that causes an autistic child to
die during an "exorcism," 33 which no doubt is a devotional prac-
tice.
Stout has not wholly bought into the social myth of the
perpetual goodness of religious actors, though, and his vision
does encompass more than simply the Christian tradition. 34 He
does acknowledge religion's capacity for hubris and untruth,35
but that is about as troubling as religion gets in Democracy &
Tradition. What he acknowledges involves immoral behavior,
but it does not encompass the religious conduct that cannot be
squared with the larger public good.
While Stout has moved the level of abstraction toward the
earth, it is still not as firmly grounded as the facts demand. If
30. See, e.g., Brian Ballou, Lawyer: Mom Didn't Plan to Sacrifice Her Chil-
dren, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 14, 2004, available at http://news.boston
herald.com/localRegional/view.bg?articleid=53969&format=text; Brian Dekon-
ing, Couple Arrested After Church Workers Fear Sacrifice, UNION LEADER
(Manchester, N.H.), Nov. 12, 2004, at A10, available at http://www.the
unionleader.com; Associated Press, Police: Couple Planned to 'Sacrifice' Three
Children on Church Altar, RELIGIONNEWSBLOG.COM, Nov. 15, 2004, http://
www.religionnewsblog.com/9386-.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
31. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361-62 (2003).
When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no sig-
nificant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a rea-
son, having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the
entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neu-
tral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class.
Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
32. See, e.g., Richard Greer, Preacher Convicted in Whipping: Faces Jailfor Directing DeKalb Church Beating, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 5, 1993, at BI;
Steve Visser & Jill Young Miller, Strong Words End Church Trial, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Oct. 15, 2002, at B1.
33. See, e.g., Derrick Nunnally, Minister Gets 30 Months in Boy's Death,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 2004, at lB.
34. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 112.
35. See id. at 84, 112.
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religion is not always a force for good and is indeed sometimes
positively evil, then how does a republican democracy handle it
in the public square? I do not ask this question simply to be
perverse. Rather, the United States is sorely lacking in politi-
cal, sociological, theological, and philosophical theories that ad-
dress and incorporate the full range of religious speech and
conduct-good and bad.
Having opened the door to a discussion of religious entities
operating against public interest, it is worthwhile to now exam-
ine what has really been at stake in the cultural war over the
alleged "marginalization" of religion or the "secularization" of
culture, to which he is responding. Although not explicit, there
is a brilliant subtext to his theory. He has shown that there has
not been a thoroughgoing secularization of culture at all, but
rather a pluralization of religion, and that these two social
phenomena are not equivalent. That is to say, what Christians
have been calling "secularization" is the displacement of their
assumed theocracy with a menu of religious beliefs. There is
secularism, but it is not anti-religious secularism. It is a secu-
larism that invites in all religious faiths. This public sphere
where Christianity does not automatically rule includes a wide
diversity of faiths, as opposed to a rejection of religion.
The mark of secularization [is] the fact that participants in a given
discursive practice are not in a position to take for granted that their
interlocutors are making the same religious assumptions they are.
This is the sense in which public discourse in modern democracies
tends to be secularized.36
Thus, the Christian perspective held by some, which as-.
sumes that it has been "the American" perspective, must now
share space in the public policy debate with Jews, Muslims,
Buddhists, Sikhs, Wiccans, and Rastafarians. "[M]odern de-
mocratic discourse tends not to be 'framed by a theological per-
spective,' but this does not prevent any of the individuals par-
ticipating in it from adopting a theological perspective." 37 The
word carrying most of the theoretical baggage in this sentence
is "framed," which means the power to set the agenda. The
power to set the national agenda is the prize in this heated cul-
tural dispute. Thus, the argument that "Christ" is being taken
out of Christmas and that Christianity is being taken out of the
culture is misplaced. Christians are being asked to make room
for other faiths, not to vacate the public stage.
36. Id. at 97.
37. Id.
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Stout's thesis is well worth elaboration. There are three
levels of meaning occurring simultaneously within the seculari-
zation debate. The first two have created a war over values that
is based on a false understanding of what reasons have been
operative in the public sphere. The third, Stout's, corrects that
factual mistake.
First, there is the simplistic claim that the whole culture
has been secularized, which is the equivalent of saying it has
gone to hell in a handbasket. What is usually meant by this
claim is that Christianity has lost its control of the social
agenda. It is inflammatory and is neither accurate nor con-
structive.
Second, there is the Rawlsian argument that seculariza-
tion, which requires religious reasons to stand aside, is the best
that we can do; 38 therefore, those who would complain about it
are simply antidemocratic or theocratic. This, too, is inflamma-
tory and is neither wholly accurate nor constructive.
Third, there is Stout's account of secularization--culture is
not being secularized in the sense that religion has been ex-
cised, but rather a dominant religious viewpoint has been
forced to make room at the table for other religious viewpoints.
Our society is religiously plural, and has remained so for several cen-
turies despite constant efforts on the part of its religious members to
appeal to their fellow citizens with reasons for converting to a single
theology.... There is no point in trying to wish the social reality of
religious diversity away, or in resenting this diversity as long as it
lasts. Until it does go away, our public discourse will be secular-
ized..., whether we want it to be or not. 39
Therein lies the pain of secularization for some contempo-
rary Christians in particular, and the motivation for some of
them to now embrace a single faith tradition in the face of this
teeming, pluralistic democratic polity. It is not that they oppose
democracy (understood as the people's will) as a theoretical
matter; rather, they oppose the way in which democracy has
displaced them from their privileged position. While "[tihey are
free to frame their contributions to [the public conversation] in
whatever vocabulary they please[, w]hat they cannot reasona-
bly do is expect a single theological perspective to be shared by
all of their interlocutors."40 Neither religious belief nor God
need be excised from this public conversation. "It is simply a
38. See id. at 68.
39. Id. at 100.
40. Id. at 97.
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matter of what can be presupposed in a discussion with other
people who happen to have different theological commitments
and interpretive dispositions."41 Of course, it is not quite simple
at all. What Stout is touching upon cannot be reduced to rea-
soned discourse between citizens, but rather the struggle for
power over values in the United States. It is hand-to-hand
combat for control, and it would seem there is likely a connec-
tion between the increasing charges of "secularization" by some
Christians and the fact that the number of Protestants (taking
all denominations together) is beginning to dip below a major-
ity of the population in the United States. 42
Stout's theory invites further elaboration on the realities of
the secularization debate as well. Despite the rhetoric, "secu-
larization" has not necessarily meant that religious entities-
even Christian-have been undermined in the public sphere.
There may well be good reason that some Christians (and other
faiths) have embraced this description, despite its negative as-
sessment of their power. It may have served their political
ends.
The secularization thesis is not an unalloyed evil for reli-
gious entities in the public sphere. Indeed, it has been quite
useful at times. There is rich irony in the fact that religious en-
tities in the United States have willingly taken on the cloak of
political powerlessness at the same time that they have exer-
cised enormous power over public policy. Three examples make
my point: (1) the federally induced state exemptions for medical
neglect of children during the Nixon administration;43 (2) the
enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),44
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA),45 and the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation
Protection Act 46 during the Clinton administration; and (3) the
faith-based initiatives in the administration of President
George W. Bush.47 And these are just a few of the many initia-
41. Id.
42. Peter Smith, Protestants Are Close to Losing Majority Status,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jul. 21, 2004, at 1A.
43. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000) (enacted 1993) (invalidated as
applied to states by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
46. Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517.
47. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001) (creat-
ing the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives); Press Release,
1163
1164 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:1153
tives that religious entities turned into law during the so-called
"secularization" era.
During the Nixon administration in the 1970s, Harry Rob-
bins "Bob" Haldeman, who served as White House chief of staff,
and John Ehrlichman, Nixon's domestic policy advisor, both
Christian Scientists, pushed for a condition to be placed on
state receipt of federal Medicare funds.48 To obtain Medicare
funding, states were required-through an interpretation of the
statute by the Department of Health and Human Services-to
enact an exemption for faith-healing parents from the medical
neglect laws.49 The Nixon administration thereby forced the
states to accept a highly contestable public policy decision at
the price of Medicare funding.
In effect, the federal Medicare law was a vehicle to make
religious parents less accountable for their children's medical
care. And it worked--over thirty states and the District of Co-
lumbia followed suit.50 Once children's advocates compre-
Health Res. & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HRSA
Awards $31 Million in New Grants to Support Abstinence Education (Jul. 12,
2004), http://newsroom.hrsa.gov/releases/2004/Abed2004.htm (last visited Jan.
17, 2005) (announcing that $31 million was awarded to abstinence-only health
education programs, including many faith-based organizations); News Re-
lease, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., New Program Promotes Choice, Accountability in Substance
Abuse Treatment (Mar. 3, 2004), http://atr.samhsa.gov/news/NewsReleases/
040303nr atr.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) (announcing that $100 million
was awarded in fiscal year 2004 to states and tribal organizations to extend
drug treatment to more Americans, allowing them a choice of drug treatment
providers, including faith-based organizations); Admin. for Children & Fami-
lies, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Family and Youth Services Bu-
reau: Mentoring Children of Prisoners Program, at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs/fysb/mcp.htm (last modified Mar. 10, 2004) (describing a program to
provide 100,000 mentors to children with parent(s) in prison and including
faith-based organizations); see also David Saperstein, Public Accountability
and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1353, 1361-63 (2003) (suggesting that "proponents of new public-religious
partnerships may be motivated by something other than a desire better to
meet the social service needs of the country," and asserting that the initiatives
benefited evangelical churches because they also had great political sway).
48. Rita Ciolli, Faith vs. Law: Christian Scientists on Trial in Baby's
Death, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 29, 1990, at 5.
49. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247,
88 Stat. 4 (1974), did not, on its face, require an exemption. The Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), however, interpreted the Act to require an
exemption. See Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program,
39 Fed. Reg. 43,936 (Dec. 19, 1974).
50. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra note 28 (manuscript at 31, on
file with author).
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hended what had happened, the jig was up, and the condition
was repealed, 51 but there are still many states that have such
exemptions.52 This is quite a successful grab for power by a
relatively small religious organization. 53 Where is the margin-
alization, trivialization, and secularization in public policy
here? It is hard to identify.
The Clinton administration was one of the top three in U.S.
history in terms of granting religious requests, 54 the other two
being President Grant's administration, which in 1869 paid out
$2 million to "Christianize the Indians,"55 and President George
W. Bush's administration, discussed below. Among other laws
benefiting religious interests, President Clinton signed both
RFRA and RLUIPA, and quite enthusiastically. Both laws pro-
51. The regulation was corrected in 1983 when HHS removed the re-
quirement for states to have an exemption. See Child Abuse and Neglect Pre-
vention and Treatment Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 3698, 3700 (Jan. 26, 1983)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(ii)) (stating that "States are free to recog-
nize or not recognize a religious exception without that choice having any ef-
fect on eligibility for a State child abuse grant"). Furthermore, the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106i(a) (2000) provides:
Nothing in this [Act] ... shall be construed ... to require that a State
find, or to prohibit a State from finding, abuse or neglect in cases in
which a parent or legal guardian relies solely or partially upon spiri-
tual means rather than medical treatment, in accordance with the re-
ligious beliefs of the parent or legal guardian.
52. As of 2004, approximately thirty states have civil medical neglect ex-
emptions. See NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S.
DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2003 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE
STATUTE SERIES STATUTES-AT-A-GLANCE: DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (2003), http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/define.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2004). My own research indicates that over forty states
and U.S. territories, however, provide exemptions from felony charges in cases
involving the death of a child caused by failure to obtain medical care. See
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra note 28 (manuscript at 321-22 n.84, on
file with author).
53. There were 194,000 Christian Scientists in 2001, down from 214,000
in 1990. BARRY A. KOSMIN, ET AL., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION
SURVEY 12 ex.1 (Graduate Ctr. of the City U. of N.Y. ed., 2001), available at
http://www.gc.cuny.edu/studies/key-findings.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
54. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Religion and the Law in the Clinton
Era: An Anti-Madisonian Legacy, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (2000);
Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America's Re-
sponse to Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 283, 319-20
(1998) (describing the Clinton administration's strong support of religious in-
terests in the United States and abroad by making it a priority of the admini-
stration and directing additional funds towards the U.S. agencies overseeing
issues of religious freedom).
55. Marci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 850-
51 (2001).
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vided religious entities benefits under the law that they had
never received before. This is not the place for an extended
analysis or explanation of RFRA,56 but suffice it to say that
RFRA imposed on the government the obligation to prove that
its laws burdening religious conduct were passed for a "compel-
ling interest" and tailored to that particular believer's needs.57
Never before had all religious entities in all situations under all
laws had the right to invoke such strict scrutiny of neutral laws
or to demand such close accommodation from the courts. Jus-
tice Stevens rightly characterized it as "a legal weapon that no
atheist or agnostic can obtain."58 Moreover, RFRA was under
consideration in Congress from 1990 until 1993, with passage
in 1993, during the height of the "marginalization" era.59
Carter's The Culture of Disbelief How American Law and Poli-
tics Trivialized Devotion was published in the very same year
that RFRA was enacted. 60
There is no question that Professor Carter's thesis was sin-
cerely held or that believers did not feel themselves to be set
aside in the political processes. They did. But RFRA belies the
reality. Indeed, religious entities' ability .to argue that they
were being socially marginalized helped them obtain RFRA's
expansive benefits. During the vast majority of the time that
RFRA was being debated in Congress, not a single member of
Congress publicly wondered whether giving such power to reli-
gious entities might harm the public good. They seem to have
believed themselves to be assisting benign and politically pow-
erless agents for the public weal, and therefore dodged the hard
questions that might have put the brakes on such a law.
After RFRA was held unconstitutional, 61 religious entities
56. For further explanation, see HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra
note 28 (manuscript at 225-37, on file with author).
57. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2000)
("Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
58. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
59. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra note 28 (manuscript at 225-27,
on file with author).
60. CARTER, supra note 11.
61. Some argue that the Court held RFRA unconstitutional only as ap-
plied to state law. Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 1 (1998). I, however, take
the position that it is unconstitutional as applied to federal law as well be-
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quickly returned to Congress and succeeded in obtaining the
introduction of the Religious Liberty Protection Act 62 by 1999.
When members of Congress became less than enthusiastic
about another across-the-board statute (in response to lobbying
by children's advocates and city and local governments), two
arenas of law were excised from the universe of all laws and
conjoined in RLUIPA, which imposed strict scrutiny on those
two arenas. Once again, the claim of marginalization carries
little force, because RLUIPA radically transforms the law of
free exercise in favor of religious entities in both spheres. Be-
fore RFRA and then RLUIPA, religious entities were subjected
to land use determinations just like any other homeowner (ex-
cept they received tax exempt status),63 and prison regulations
were subject to intermediate scrutiny at most, certainly not
strict.64 RLUIPA changed the law to strongly benefit religious
entities, once again disproving the notion that religious entities
have been politically marginalized.
Clinton also signed the Religious Liberty and Charitable
Donation Protection Act of 1998, which protected believers'
tithes to their religious organizations from being recaptured for
the bankruptcy estate when they declared bankruptcy.65 Nor-
cause it violates settled separation of power principles by placing courts in the
shoes of the legislature and permitting them to make the laws. Hamilton, su-
pra, at 1; Marci Hamilton, A Federal Appeals Court Says a Religious Group
Can Import Illegal Drugs: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Shows Its
True Colors, FINDLAW, Nov. 18, 2004, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20041118.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
62. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
63. See Darren E. Carnell, Zoning Churches: Washington State Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Application of Land Use Regulations to Religious
Buildings, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 699, 701-02 (2002) (discussing how, for the
larger part of the twentieth century, courts deferred to municipal zoning deci-
sions when land use regulations were challenged); Terry Rice, Re-Evaluating
the Balance Between Zoning Regulations and Religious and Educational Uses,
8 PACE L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (discussing how federal courts are much more def-
erential to municipal zoning decisions than New York state courts when land
use regulation of religious institutions is involved, and also suggesting that
the analysis of federal courts effectively excludes zoning regulations from free
exercise protection because the zoning burdens on the religious practices do
not warrant such protection).
64. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50, 353
(1987) (requiring deference to prison authorities' judgments in balancing le-
gitimate penological interests against the religious practices of inmates);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (holding that prison regulations
stand if prison authorities succeed in showing that the regulation serves "le-
gitimate penological interests").
65. See The Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of
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mally, certain payments made by a debtor within one year of
declaring bankruptcy can be returned to the estate. 66 Once
again, religious entities were hardly being cast aside by the po-
litical process.
In terms of aiding religion from the federal podium, there
is not a great deal of difference between the Clinton and Bush
eras. Indeed, Bush's faith-based initiative originated during
Clinton's tenure, but there has been a more obvious play on the
part of the Bush administration to appeal to religiously moti-
vated voters. The administration has spread federal money
from secular social services into a number of religious social
service providers, despite the fact that there are strong argu-
ments under the Establishment Clause to question such pro-
grams and therefore they will be subject to repeated litiga-
tion.67 The publicly-groomed perception of incapacity or
powerlessness spurred the faith-based initiative-there was a
widespread perception that religious groups were being dis-
criminated against because the government did not give them
funds for social services while it funded secular services. 68 That
talk of discrimination permitted them to gloss over the other-
wise clear Establishment Clause problems in a government
program that funds religious mission. In a move that made the
discrimination claim even more compelling, it was argued that
they deserved the funding because they could do a better job
redressing social concerns than secular organizations. 69
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) to ex-
empt charitable contributions).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000); see also Thomas M. Walsh, Note, Religious
Liberty and Charitable Donation Act of 1998: Putting the Fear of God into
Bankruptcy Creditors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 235, 238-43 (1999).
67. See, e.g., David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist
Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 602 (2002) ("[E]ven
indirect funding of such programs would offend the Establishment Clause be-
cause it would require government approval of a religious method for express-
ing the government's message.").
68. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan.
20, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005) ("By executive order, I have opened billions of dollars
in grant money to competition that includes faith-based charities. Tonight I
ask you to codify this into law, so people of faith can know that law will never
discriminate against them again.").
69. President Bush has made numerous statements espousing these faith-
based initiatives. E.g., President George W. Bush, Address at the Downtown
Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/12/20021212-3.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) ("No gov-
ernment policy can put hope in people's hearts or a sense of purpose in peo-
1168 [89:1153
2005] "RELIGION" IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
The faith-based initiative is even more fascinating in light
of the fact that it rests on an assumption that many religious
organizations stand ready to provide social services. In reality,
religious organizations in the United States dedicate only a
very small portion of their income to such causes.70 Thus,
again, one must tease out the truth from the mythology in the
religious freedom debate. It is not only a debate about religious
belief, but also about how religious believers (as well as nonbe-
lievers) manipulate the public arena.
Stout's focus on conversation does not address the play of
power that determines how views are cast into the public
square. One wonders how this element might be incorporated
into his theory. There seems to be an assumption that all reli-
gious speech-and perhaps all speech-in this conversation is
sincere and without hidden agenda. Perhaps Stout could fairly
defend himself on the ground that he is just sketching the the-
ory for the first time, so it is not fair to criticize him for what is
not there. Fair enough, but quite a bit is at stake in accurately
capturing how this conversation goes forward and its elements.
Perhaps unfortunately, the United States' public conversation
is not even close to being a well-mannered exchange of sin-
cerely held views in many circumstances, and therefore, there
is a question in my mind, at least, about how political reality
would or should alter his calculus. Perhaps he would say that
he intends to include all such speech, sincere or devious, politi-
cally motivated or not. If so, his theory would encompass the
possibility-which already exists in fact-that the players in
ple's lives. That is done when someone, some good soul puts an arm around a
neighbor and says, God loves you, and I love, and you can count on us both.");
White House, Rallying the Armies of Compassion, at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/news/reports/faithbased.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) ("Traditional so-
cial programs are often too bureaucratic, inflexible, and impersonal to meet
the acute and complex needs of the poor. Reforms must make the Federal
Government a partner with faith-based and community organizations that are
close to the needs of people and trusted by those who hurt."); White House Of-
fice of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Message from Jim Towey, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/message.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2005) ("[T]hese organizations 'inspire hope in a way that government never
can. And they inspire life-changing faith in a way that government never
should."') (quoting President Bush); White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives, President Bush's Faith-Based and Community Initia-
tive, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/mission.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2005) ("[Dlespite efforts by the Federal and State governments to bat-
tle social distress, too many of our neighbors still suffer from poverty and de-
spair.").
70. See MARK CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA 44-93 (2004).
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the political game are going to get dirty, which means religion
may push agendas that are not always admirable and therefore
may deserve to be treated to less than a totally respectful
stance. But if that is his theory, his definitions of religion, reli-
gious liberty, and religious reasons need further reticulation.
While Stout acknowledges the inevitable conflicts between
religious beliefs in the public sphere when he refers to "the role
of free public reason in a political culture that includes conflict-
ing religious conceptions of the good,"71 it is often as though he
is describing only constructive exchanges between wholesome
viewpoints. The use of "conceptions of the good" has too much
the flavor of a Platonic theory of religious ideas, which would be
wholly inadequate to capture the positive and negative energy
of religious belief and practice in the United States. It would be
more accurate to say that there is often a clash of positions-
each of which may be derived from religious belief-regarding
public policy.
This reader at least asks, where in his thesis is the explicit
acknowledgment of the evil that religions can perpetrate in the
political process? To be fair, there are glancing blows when he
quickly states, usually indirectly, that religious entities might
be "prideful" or might not be fully honest, but this is at most a
deep subtext. It needs to be more explicitly explained and fitted
into the general structure of his approach. He is starting from
his concrete observations of this culture, and there are plenty of
examples that could be used to catalyze a richer description of
the political conversation. For example, the Catholic Church
has lobbied quite publicly to exempt clergy from state laws re-
quiring the reporting of child abuse to protect the secrecy of the
confessional.7 2 While this is no doubt a factor, there is good rea-
son to believe that it has been fighting mandatory reporting
statutes to protect what it knows full well is an ugly history of
hiding childhood sexual abuse by its own priests. Thus, their
public stance has been a cover to engage in antisocial behavior.
What about the Christian Scientists and their success in the
1970s in getting the federal government to require states to ex-
empt faith-healing parents from the children's medical neglect
71. STOUT, supra note 1, at 2.
72. See, e.g., Jo Becker & Caryle Murphy, McCarrick Decries Md. Child
Abuse Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2003, at Bi; Conrad deFriebre, Sex-Abuse
Reporting Bill Finds Opposition, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 8, 2002, at
1A.
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laws to obtain Medicare funding? 73 The federal government's
power was turned to enlarging the power of parents to permit
their children to suffer for the parents' religious principles, and
some of them to die. Where is the ethic or virtue there? But it is
indisputably religion in the public sphere. What about the Ar-
yan Brotherhood in the prisons or the Ku Klux Klan inside and
out?
Stout says our "substantive" norms "commit us to ideals of
equal voice and equal consideration for all citizens, to take two
examples of normative commitments that distinguish us from
our unapologetically hierarchical ancestors."74 The problem
with this proposition is that what he means by "equal" and "us"
is amorphous. If he means that Americans in general believe in
equality of access to the public square, he may be right as a
general matter, but he needs to square that claim with the fact
that a significant number of faiths reject these values. There
are plenty of religious arrangements that do not institute or
encourage it, and therefore are not part of the "us" to which he
refers. There are many norms among religious communities
that do not honor equal voice or equal consideration. What
about the children's voices on all issues, including whether
medical treatment can be refused on the basis of the religious
beliefs of their parents? What about the religious households,
often fundamentalist, where the man is in charge of that which
is outside the home, while the woman is limited to being in the
home and therefore does not have equal access to the public
square? If "equal access and consideration" means that indi-
viduals bring to the public debate their independently reached
beliefs and not simply a repetition of what they have been told
to say (and I do think this is assumed in various places in the
book), examples abound in the religious universe where the op-
posite value is held: believers are to choose what the religious
organization dictates. For example, church order in the Catho-
lic Church, which at least for now is the largest single Chris-
tian denomination in the United States, still follows a hierar-
chical, paternalistic pattern that dictates public policy choices
to its members. It is simply a fact that there are religious enti-
ties that challenge the notion of individualized and independ-
ent participation in the public square. Stout's equality ground
73. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
74. STOUT, supra note 1, at 3.
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rule for the conversation, therefore, is in tension with enough
faiths that further explanation is needed.
And there is a further complication: plenty of members do
not follow their religious organization's dictates. There are two
distinct sources of public policy coming from a religious source:(1) the religious entities that claim to be speaking for their
many members, and (2) the individuals who may or may not toe
the religious entity's line. For example, 88% of Catholic Church
members favor the use of birth control, which is strictly prohib-
ited by doctrine the Church has repeatedly reaffirmed.7 5 To re-
flect this reality, Stout's hypothesis would have to be expanded
to include in the conversation not only individual citizens, but
also their organizations. Stout's hypothesis would then have to
be further refined by recognizing that although religious or-
ganizations claim to speak for their members, they sometimes,
and perhaps often, do not. All of that is religious conversation.
There is yet another layer as well. Does "religious" always
mean a view that is expressed because the speaker believes in
it as a matter of faith? He states that not all claims about relig-
ion in the public square are faith claims, but this element of the
discussion seems rather opaque and deserving of further de-
lineation. There are many levels of religious talk, from straight-
forward devotion to a religious doctrine (or one's individual in-
terpretation of that doctrine within one's own faith) to the most
abstract conception of theology. Democracy & Tradition em-
ploys Augustine's and other theologians' views to anchor his-
tory. But I would like to draw attention to another kind of reli-
gious talk-the use of religious ideas to serve secular purposes.
In other words, ideas that arise in the religious context can be
retooled so that its religious content is jettisoned, but its use-
fulness continues.
75. See Megan Hartman, Humanae Vitae: Thirty Years of Discord and
Dissent, CONSCIENCE, Autumn 1998, http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/contra
ceptionlthirty.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) (citing N.Y. Times/CBS News
poll, Apr. 21-23, 1994, subsample of 446 Catholics, margin of error ±5%). Ap-proximately half of Catholics identify as pro-choice or believe that abortion
should be legal. Catholics for a Free Choice, Catholic Voters Support LegalAbortion, RELIGIOUS CONSULTATION, July 2, 2004, at http://www.religiouscon
sultation.orgNews Tracker/Catholicvoters_support legal abortion.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005) (reporting that 53% of Catholics identify as pro-choice
and that 61% believe abortion should be legal); see also Americans Polled on
Fetal Rights, NAT'L CATH. REP., June 20, 2003, at 11 (reporting that 47% of
Catholics are pro-choice).
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There is a great deal of slippage in the current debate over
whether this is a "Christian country." Those asserting the claim
hold that Christians founded the country, and therefore their
values undergird the country, so it is a Christian country. If
they are correct, the secularization thesis would be insulting.
They have assumed the answer to their question because they
have failed to ask whether the theological views they claim
founded the country were then put to religious or secular pur-
poses. I would argue the latter, but that does not make such
"religious speech" less religious or less valuable to the public
debate. (All of which is to say that the complexity of what Stout
is identifying can be a bit daunting once one focuses.)
Theological ideas are there for the taking in the political
sphere, and they are borrowed all the time for secular purposes,
starting with the Framers. For example, when the Framers ar-
rived in Philadelphia, they faced an emergency.76 The govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation was a complete fail-
ure, and the states were starting to come apart. 77 They drew on
every tool they could to craft a system that could bring the
states back together in a common enterprise.78 Those tools in-
cluded their studies of classic Greece and Rome, Corinth, Euro-
pean governments, political philosophers, and their knowledge
of Christian theology, and in particular Calvinism, ideas which
were important bases for the construction of the experimental
form of government devised at the Convention.7 9 Indeed, the
form of democracy that defines the context of the conversation
Stout is analyzing is the form crafted largely through Calvinist
principles at the Convention.80
II. WHAT IS "DEMOCRACY'?
The Framers chose representative democracy, and con-
sciously rejected direct democracy.8' The choice has tremendous
impact on the necessity of and the purpose of the public conver-
sation. There is good reason to ask what Stout means by "de-
mocracy." The term is such a loaded one in many disciplines
that it is surprising to see it without qualification in an other-
76. Marci A. Hamilton, Direct Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411, 418-26 (2004).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 412-14, 426-51, 453.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 428-51; see also STOUT, supra note 1, at 167-68.
81. See Hamilton, supra note 76, at 452-56.
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wise finely crafted philosophical work. He seems to be using it
as a stand-in for the principle of antitradition, and he does so
because he is in the midst of a profound discourse with so many
other ethicists and theologians. From within that discourse, its
use makes some sense. But from without, with his theory
standing on its own, it can lead the theory astray.
For Stout, democracy is the classic Hegelian synthesis: it is
antitradition and tradition existing at the same time in an on-
going, dialectical relationship. Indeed, he draws on Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Immanuel Kant, though his ex-
plicit focus is on the Americans: John Rawls, Alasdair MacIn-
tyre, Stanley Hauerwas, John Dewey and Ralph Waldo Emer-
son, and to a lesser extent David Thoreau.
To know what "democracy" means, a modifier must be
added: direct or representative. For Stout, it is quite plain that
he does not really mean the former. In an endnote that de-
served textual placement, he cautions the reader, "Notice that I
do not define modern democracy simply as rule by the people.
Nor do I place emphasis primarily on the electoral process."8 2
What he describes, and rightly so if his focus is on the United
States, is representative democracy, which is a radically differ-
ent social order from pure democracy. He envisions the gov-
ernment as follows: "A congress or parliament ... serves at the
people's pleasure, and is expected to deliberate 'not on its own
behalf but in response to a wider context of deliberation, open
to all, to which it must be attending carefully."'8 3 This is classic
republicanism, with elected representatives contemplating a
larger horizon than any single citizen, and responsible to the
public good. Moreover, citizens have only two means of influ-
encing public policy, as I argued a decade ago: the right to
choose representatives and the power to express their views
through the two-way stream of communication the Constitution
constructs between the people and their representatives.8 4 It is
82. STOUT, supra note 1, at 309 n.3.
83. Id. at 4 (quoting OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS:
REDISCOVERING THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY 270 (1996)).
84. A decade ago I wrote:
A two-way communication process, along with the power to elect and
to refuse to reelect, forges the necessary link between the people and
their representatives in a free society. This link is forged by mutual
challenge, however, rather than blind trust. The attorneyship model
reinforces the historical presumption that the people should challenge
the legislator's decisions as well as the exercise of her delegated pow-
ers. Freedom of expression and the press serve that goal.
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"a form of government in which the adult members of the soci-
ety being governed all have some share in electing rulers and
are free to speak their minds in a wide-ranging discussion that
rulers are bound to take seriously."8 5 It is curious that he did
not choose "representative democracy" in favor of "democracy,"
with all of its imprecision. But it is this attenuated, representa-
tive side of democracy that he means. The conversation does
not exist so the people may make the law, but rather so they
can influence it. That is a dramatic difference, which is often
glossed over in the United States. Although it is quite clear he
means representative democracy, clearer reference to it would
have enriched his theory.
The genius of Stout's approach is that he has taken Hegel's
dialectic and synthesized it with the best of republican theory
and American pragmatism. He rejects the notion that we must
enter into a contract before entering into society for society to
operate. That is too formalistic to describe how citizens interact
under the law.
Hegel's ... dialectical story implies that contractarianism is incorrect
in thinking that something like the social contract is needed as the
basis of social cooperation. Our normative concepts are not instituted
at the contractual level and then applied on the basis of the constitu-
tive contract. They are instituted in the process of mutual recognition
in which individuals hold one another responsible and implicitly im-
pute to others the authority to keep normative track of one another's
attitudes. This process does not need the social contract to get going
or to get along s6
There are significant synchronicities between his theory
and the legal and political notion of republican democracy that
would have been quite conducive to his conclusions. He is not
always talking about conversation by itself, but more than once
talks about how this conversation holds others accountable to
the culture. This notion of accountability to others, beyond
one's own solipsist self, is vintage republicanism.
Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth
of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
477, 541-42 (1994); see also Hamilton, supra note 76, at 434; Marci A. Hamil-
ton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the
Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 257,
267-74, 276-87, 289-91 (2003) (describing various mechanisms within the
Constitution that construct a two-way pathway of communication between
representative government and the people).
85. STOUT, supra note 1, at 4.
86. Id. at 82.
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Republican democracy, in its U.S. iteration, rejects rule by
the people because the Framers did not trust the people to
rule.8 7 And that elevates the importance of the conversation
Stout is describing. For the people to have any influence beyond
the voting booth, they must participate in the public square's
exchange of views. It is for that reason that the secularization
thesis has had such bite-for a citizen to lose the capacity to
participate in public debate is to give up one of only two means
by which the people can influence public policy. So the stakes
are high in this debate. It is crucial that the qualities of the
system be accurately identified because only then can one begin
to diagnose faults in the system and the treatments that would
redress them.
While I would endorse much of what Stout has done, I do
think he has sold his dialectical theory short when he states
that "secularization has deposed political theology from the so-
cial role it became accustomed to performing in Christendom.
There is thus a sense in which the political community appears
to have been desacralized. .. ,"88 1 question whether there was
ever a time when Christendom controlled, by itself, public jus-
tice. As early as the twelfth century in Britain, King Henry II
introduced the notion of the common law when he urged that
all criminals be tried in civil (royal) courts and the abolition of
the ecclesiastical courts, which meted out lesser criminal penal-
87. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[T]he
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without
constraint."); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 50
(Max Farrand ed., 1966) (Pierce Butler) (stating that direct democracy was
"impracticable"); id. at 132-33 (James Wilson) ("Representation is made nec-
essary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively."); id. at
134-36 (James Madison) (discussing the benefits of representative over direct
democracy); id. at 151-52 (James Madison) (discussing the evils of direct de-
mocracy); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 44 (1990) (stating that Madison believed "revision of
the Confederation could cure the mischief of popular government within the
states"). See generally Hamilton, supra note 76 (describing the turbulent pre-
Constitution experience and Calvinist theology as inspirations for the Fram-
ers' distrust of direct democracy).
James Madison expressed the following concern with rule by the people:
Complaints are everywhere heard.., that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the
rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior
force of an interested and overbearing majority.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison).
88. STOUT, supra note 1, at 103.
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ties for identical actions simply because the defendant was a
clergyman.8 9 Thus, there was a concept even then of a justice
that transcended religion. So to say that in the twenty-first
century there is a public square where secular and religious
ideas mix, may not be much of an innovation at all, even if itis
a brilliant insight past contemporary mythology into current
practices.
CONCLUSION
The payoff for Stout's thesis that the public square is and
should be open to religious discourse is significant. He trans-
forms "ethical deliberation and political debate"90 into a com-
plex exchange, which takes place in the context of pluralism
and many beliefs and voices. The signal contribution of Democ-
racy & Tradition is that it draws into the public square all citi-
zens, but not as a formalistic matter alone. He is observing
their presence and building a working theory around their al-
ready entrenched presence. One can only hope that his ac-
knowledgment of religious entities' already thick participation
in the public square will still the claims of antireligious secu-
larization, and move the discussion to the more constructive
question of how one chooses between so many different world-
views to reach sensible public policy. Perhaps the answer is as
pragmatic as the theory: it happens all the time. This project
may well be a thoroughgoing hermeneutic.
Stout has at least two roads to take here, and he need not
necessarily choose between these. Either the sheer variety of.,
the ideas in the marketplace provides such a wealth of possi-
bilities and permutations that their very copresence generates
new ideas. In other words, the multiplicity itself engenders a
synergy of ideas, generating new ideas. They compete with
each other, provide context, and in the end the best idea for the
times (remember, it is a dialectic that has not just started to-
day and will not end today) can be chosen. When it proves defi-
cient, the process repeats itself with the contemporary mix of
ideas at hand.
Or, perhaps, this variety of viewpoints, many of them reli-
gious, will find some common ethos, which may not even be
89. See HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra note 28 (manuscript at
243-46, on file with author); Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 28,
at 1123-27.
90. STOUT, supra note 1, at 293.
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comprehended yet. It is not that they all must start from the
same position, or that they share the same values, but rather
that the ideas being floated may well jibe with other ideas, and
produce a consensus through mutual recognition. Perhaps both
of these options are descriptive of the process, and as he further
develops the theory, Stout will explain more fully how solutions
to difficult social issues can be distilled from what is in fact a
pluralistic base.
